Personal Honesty as an Epistemological Key in the Works of C.S. Lewis by Mitchell, Mike
Inklings Forever
Volume 4 A Collection of Essays Presented at the
Fourth Frances White Ewbank Colloquium on C.S.
Lewis & Friends
Article 28
3-2004
Personal Honesty as an Epistemological Key in the
Works of C.S. Lewis
Mike Mitchell
Follow this and additional works at: https://pillars.taylor.edu/inklings_forever
Part of the English Language and Literature Commons, History Commons, Philosophy
Commons, and the Religion Commons
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Center for the Study of C.S. Lewis & Friends at Pillars at Taylor University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Inklings Forever by an authorized editor of Pillars at Taylor University. For more information, please contact
pillars@taylor.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mitchell, Mike (2004) "Personal Honesty as an Epistemological Key in the Works of C.S. Lewis," Inklings Forever: Vol. 4 , Article 28.
Available at: https://pillars.taylor.edu/inklings_forever/vol4/iss1/28
  
INKLINGS FOREVER, Volume IV 
A Collection of Essays Presented at  
The Fourth  
 
FRANCES WHITE EWBANK COLLOQUIUM  
ON  
C.S. LEWIS & FRIENDS 
 
Taylor University 2004 
Upland, Indiana 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personal Honesty as an Epistemological Key 
in the Works of C.S. Lewis 
 
 
Mike Mitchell  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mitchell, Mike. “Personal Honesty as an Epistemological Key in the Works of C.S. Lewis.” 
Inklings Forever 4 (2004) www.taylor.edu/cslewis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Personal Honesty as an Epistemological Key in the Works of C.S. Lewis 
Mike Mitchell 
 
 
 
 
Once when asked what he thought of a book 
entitled Honest to God, Lewis replied, “I prefer being 
honest to being ‘honest to God.’”1 It is an unmitigated 
honesty, with one’s self and with God, which Lewis 
establishes as the central epistemological issue. This is 
not a surface level honesty—not a general, storge 
honesty—but an honesty directly related to the purity 
and intensity of one’s will. According to Lewis, the 
condition of one’s will is the epistemological key. 
Through a scrutiny of internal motives and of emotional 
prejudices, Lewis’s epistemology seeks to expose all 
those factors in human nature that so constantly, yet 
subtly, evade and distort the truth. This is not to say that 
Lewis did not place a high value on a person’s ability to 
reason and the quality of his or her logic—especially 
the logic of theological inquiry—but he understood that 
this was not the primary issue in the process of 
discovering the truth.  
This being the case, Lewis’s approach can best be 
described as an epistemology of the will. The quality of 
one’s will to believe is the most decisive factor in 
someone being in a state of belief or unbelief. In 
Lewis’s perspective, a person’s desire to know the truth 
must exceed the desire to secure self-interests. 
It necessarily follows from the orthodox Christian 
concept of an all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good God, 
and from the fact that his explicit intent is for people to 
know him, that if a person who claims to want to know 
him does not know him—does not see what God has 
attempted to explicitly show—that the person must be 
less than honest in his or her claim to seek God. As will 
be shown, the presence of such dishonesty often results 
in a shallow, yet comforting illusion, which ultimately 
results in an inability to know one’s own true identity, 
God’s identity, and the necessary implications therein.  
It will be good to begin with a passage from 
Chapter nine in The Great Divorce which is very 
indicative of Lewis’s view of the importance of honesty 
and/or purity of will. In this passage the protagonist 
asks George Macdonald about the fate of “the poor 
Ghosts who never get into the omnibus at all,” 
essentially raising the question of the fate of those who 
lie outside the truth and that of the accessibility of the 
truth to them. Macdonald replies: 
 
Everyone who wishes it does. Never fear. 
There are only two kinds of people in the end: 
those who say to God, ‘Thy will be done,’ and 
those to whom God says, in the end, ‘Thy will 
be done.’ All that are in Hell choose it. 
Without that self-choice there could be no 
Hell. No soul that seriously and constantly 
desires joy will ever miss it. Those who seek 
find. To those who knock it is opened. 
 
If it is the case that no one who “seriously and 
constantly desires joy will ever miss it,” why then are 
there so many (The Great Divorce is filled with 
descriptions of them) of those who do miss it and yet 
experience such a deep sense of injustice? For many 
people, the mere idea of Hell evokes such a sense of 
injustice that they paradoxically claim to reject 
orthodox Christian doctrine on moral grounds. This 
sense of injustice is often a result of a person’s failure 
to come to terms with his or her own sin. It is a willful 
blindness for the sake of defending one’s own 
righteousness.  
No where in Lewis’s writing is this issue 
expounded on more thoroughly than in the work he 
personally considered to be his masterpiece, Till We 
Have Faces. This story, written as a novel, retells the 
Greek myth of Cupid and Psyche as a means to 
allegorically answer the question raised by the disciple 
Judas (not Judas Iscariot) in John 14:22: “But, Lord, 
why do you intend to show yourself to us and not to the 
world?”—a question which brings to a sharp point the 
issue raised above: why are those who see God so 
seemingly few, when he is “not wanting anyone to 
perish, but everyone to come to repentance?”2 
Orual, the protagonist and speaker throughout the 
story, explains her motivation for writing the story:  
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I am old now and have not much to fear from 
the anger of gods. I have no husband nor 
child, nor hardly a friend, through whom they 
can hurt me . . . Being, for all these reasons, 
free from fear, I will write in this book what 
no one who has happiness would dare to write. 
I will accuse the gods, especially the god who 
lives on the Grey Mountain. That is, I will tell 
all he has done to me from the very beginning, 
as if I were making my complaint of him 
before a judge. But there is no judge between 
gods and men, and the god of the mountain 
will not answer me.3 
 
She “accuses” the gods and explains the source of the 
freedom with which she writes to be the fact that there 
is no one through whom the gods can hurt her. Clearly, 
Orual’s case screams of injustice—an injustice 
grounded in the thought that she suffers at the hands of 
the gods, yet is given no clear access to them or to an 
understanding of their demands on her. As revealed in 
the last line of this passage, it is this concealing of the 
gods—their refusal to reveal themselves to her—that is 
Orual’s main contention against them: “there is no 
judge between gods and men, and the god of the 
mountain will not answer me.”  
One of the ways in which Lewis conveys his point 
with such power is that, through much of the story, 
Orual’s case against the gods appears to be a fairly 
justified one. Orual’s earthly life is not at all an easy 
one. She is the unwanted daughter of a tyrant king, has 
a strikingly unattractive appearance, and a self-absorbed 
sister whose appearance is just the opposite. While 
Orual is still a child, her mother dies giving birth to her 
youngest sister, Psyche, with whom Orual eventually 
has a relationship that is sweeter than the rest of her life 
is bitter.  
However, despite the blissful relationship between 
the two girls and the apparently redeeming value it has 
in Orual’s otherwise treacherous life, Psyche is 
eventually taken from her. She is offered in sacrifice to 
the god of the Grey Mountain mentioned in the opening 
passage, and thus the suspicion based on Orual’s plight 
up until the time of Psyche—that the gods had hated 
her—is seemingly confirmed, but not without some 
doubt. The offering of Psyche to the god of the Grey 
Mountain turns out to be a marriage rather than a 
sacrifice, which is Lewis’s allegorical expression of 
Psyche’s conversion. Soon after, Orual makes a 
dangerous trek to retrieve Psyche from the mountain 
and upon finding her is deeply troubled as Psyche 
speaks of a god and a palace of grandeur (all part of the 
conversion experience), none of which Orual can see. 
She is thrown into a crisis of faith, but quickly decides 
that the responsibility for her lack of sight of the object 
of faith lies with the gods and not with herself. Her 
account of her fleeting vision is very telling: 
 
And now, you who read, give judgment. That 
moment when I either saw or thought I saw the 
House—does it tell against the gods or against 
me? Would they (if they answered) make it a 
part of their defence? Say it was a sign, a hint, 
beckoning me to answer the riddle one way 
rather than the other? I’ll not grant them that. 
What is the use of a sign which is itself only 
another riddle? . . . They set the riddle and 
then allow a seeming that can’t be tested and 
can only quicken and thicken the tormenting 
whirlpool of your guess-work. If they had an 
honest intention to guide us, why is their 
guidance not plain? Psyche could speak plain 
when she was three; do you tell me the gods 
have not yet come so far?4 
 
Throughout the story, and culminating with the 
exchange between the two sisters, Lewis allegorically 
poses the glaring question about Jesus’s seeming 
selectiveness in revealing himself to people. Why do 
the gods choose to reveal themselves with such lucidity 
to Psyche, and yet with vague, fleeting visions to Orual? 
Orual’s conclusion is that the reason for such apparent 
favoritism is the capriciousness and injustice of the 
gods.  
Soon after Orual’s discovery of the differences in 
what she and Psyche can and cannot see, she attempts 
to turn to the gods in prayer in a passage of great 
strategic importance in conveying the thrust of Lewis’s 
message about the importance of honesty in 
epistemology. When Orual returns home after her 
encounter with Psyche, she is soon left alone and then 
does something she says she thinks, “few have done”: 
 
I spoke to the gods myself, alone, in such 
words as came to me, not in a temple, and 
without a sacrifice. I stretched myself face 
downward on the floor and called upon them 
with my whole heart. I took back every word I 
had said against them. I promised anything 
they might ask of me, if only they would send 
me a sign. They gave me none. When I began 
there was red firelight in the room and rain on 
the roof; when I rose up again the fire had 
sunk a little lower, and the rain drummed on 
as before.5 
 
Because her prayer is portrayed as a genuine one, it is 
this passage that gives Orual’s case against the gods the 
most credence. It is a prayer offered in seemingly 
authentic humility, but is still met with only silence. 
The shape of Orual’s argument against the gods is 
very important in understanding the epistemological 
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point Lewis is making. The sympathy for Orual evoked 
from the reader is key in his didactic strategy. Orual is 
not a fatuitous, pampered character who takes the good 
things in life for granted. There are few good things in 
her life, and when she receives the rare gift of genuine 
love, the very person who gives it is taken away from 
her. She is then told of the immense grandeur on the 
mountain, which, if real, would remedy all her pain and 
bring utter fulfillment, but she is unable to see it. Then 
her seemingly authentic plea to the gods for answers is 
met with dead silence.  
This dilemma is also raised with painful clarity in 
Lewis’s much more personal work, A Grief Observed, 
in which he records his thoughts and feelings during a 
period of bereavement after the death of his wife. 
Notice the striking similarity of Orual’s complaint 
against the gods and Lewis’s own emotions as he seeks 
God’s comfort in his time of tremendous pain: 
 
Meanwhile, where is God? This is one of the 
most disquieting symptoms. When you are 
happy, so happy that you have no sense of 
needing Him, so happy that you are tempted to 
feel His claims upon you as an interruption, if 
you remember yourself and turn to Him with 
gratitude and praise, you will be—or so it 
feels—welcomed with open arms. But go to 
Him when your need is desperate, when all 
other help is vain, and what do you find? A 
door slammed in your face, and a sound of 
bolting and double bolting on the inside. After 
that, silence. You may as well turn away. The 
longer you wait, the more emphatic the silence 
will become. There are no lights in the 
windows. It might be an empty house. Was it 
ever inhabited? It seemed so once. And that 
seeming was as strong as this. What can this 
mean? Why is He so present a commander in 
our time of prosperity and so very absent a 
help in time of trouble?6 
 
It is a sense of injustice that under girds both Orual’s 
case against the gods and Lewis’s own feelings in his 
bereavement. Judas’s question is found woven 
throughout these and others of Lewis’s works. Why 
does God show himself to some and not to others? Why 
does he remain silent when someone so desires to hear 
him to speak?  
As in the case with Orual, many are tempted to 
think this reflects God’s arbitrary nature and his 
indifference to human need. As has been said, many 
argue that the lack of success in God’s plan to make 
himself known is his fault. Orual, however, is 
eventually faced with the sobering reality that the only 
obstacle which prevents her from seeing all that Psyche 
sees and from hearing the gods clearly lies completely 
within herself. At the end of the story Orual stands in 
the presence of the gods on her judgment day and is 
forced to read her complaint against them from the 
book in which she has written this complaint over and 
over again through the course of her life. Amazingly, 
when this same complaint, which has always sounded 
so completely justified, is read in the immortal world—
that is in the real world—it sounds completely different 
than when Orual is writing it. The book of complaint 
itself even appears differently when it is seen in 
immortality: “A little, shabby, crumpled thing, nothing 
like my great book that I had worked on all day, day 
after day . . . ”7 And when she is forced to read the 
complaint aloud what is heard is not the words that she 
has said, but those she has meant. Thus, the hollow, 
self-centered grounds on which she bases her case 
against the gods is revealed.  
Then, in what is arguably the most riveting passage 
in the book, Orual realizes why the gods have not 
shown themselves to her, despite her incessant request: 
 
The complaint was the answer. To have heard 
myself making it was to be answered. Lightly 
men talk of saying what they mean . . . When 
the time comes to you at which you will be 
forced at last to utter the speech which has lain 
at the center of your soul for years, which you 
have, all that time, idiot-like, been saying over 
and over, you’ll not talk about joy of words. I 
saw well why the gods do not speak to us 
openly, nor let us answer. Till that word can 
be dug out of us, why should they hear the 
babble that we think we mean? How can they 
meet us face to face till we have faces?8 
 
It is only when we are honest enough to show God our 
true faces that he is able to show us his. Thus the 
question that plagues Orual throughout the story is 
answered in her realization that she has not been honest 
enough in asking to receive an answer.  
Similarly, Lewis makes an observation toward the 
end of A Grief Observed that provides some remedy for 
the dissonance expressed in the passage cited earlier.  
 
I have gradually been coming to feel that the 
door is no longer shut and bolted. Was it my 
own frantic need that slammed it in my face? 
The time when there is nothing at all in your 
soul except a cry for help may be just the time 
when God can’t give it: you are like the 
drowning man who can’t be helped because he 
clutches and grabs. Perhaps your own 
reiterated cries deafen you to the voice you 
hoped to hear.  
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On the other hand, “Knock and it shall be 
opened.” But does knocking mean hammering 
and kicking the door like a maniac? And 
there’s also “To him that hath shall be given.” 
After all, you must have a capacity to receive, 
or even omnipotence can’t give. Perhaps your 
own passion temporarily destroys the 
capacity.9 
 
Once it is understood that certain legitimate passions 
like grief can hinder our capacity to receive knowledge 
from God, it becomes all the more clear how those 
sinful passions, which are inherently contrary to God’s 
nature, can deafen our ears to his voice, just as they 
deafen Orual. 
Each of the above cases emphatically makes the 
point that the responsibility for the failure of God’s 
endeavor to reveal himself lies completely with the 
people who do not receive the revelation. The important 
thing to see in the above examples is that if a person is 
honest enough to admit his or her sin, this, in itself, 
does not solve the problem of God’s inaccessibility 
(only repentance can do that), but it does show the 
problem to be a moral rather than epistemological one. 
In other words, if a person were to persist in sin, he or 
she would still be damned, but would raise no 
epistemological dilemma—no theatrical screams of 
injustice. The truly honest person would never ask the 
question, “If God is real, why doesn’t he reveal 
himself?” 
This being said, it is clear that the basis for 
disbelief in Lewis’s characters is emotional or moral 
rather than rational. It is not an absence of evidence, or 
even the presence of contrary evidence that obstructs 
the revelation of God. It is the inability to come to 
terms with the obstruction of personal sinfulness or 
misplaced value; one does not have the heart to tell 
one’s self it is evil.  
Lewis shows this same principle in A Grief 
Observed when he calls into question God’s goodness. 
Again, much like Orual, what Lewis has to say in the 
book takes the form of an argument, or rather a case 
against God. But the “argument” is eventually exposed 
as an emotional vent in disguise. After being motivated 
by his deep grief to question God’s goodness, Lewis 
asks, “Why do I make room in my mind for such filth 
and nonsense? Do I hope that if feeling disguises itself 
as thought I shall feel less? Aren’t all these notes the 
senseless writhings of a man who won’t accept the fact 
that there is nothing we can do with suffering except to 
suffer it?”10 In the same way, the question “Why 
doesn’t God reveal himself” is often a feeling disguised 
as thought—the writhing of an unfulfilled person who 
cannot honestly face the fact of his own sin and so, like 
Orual, instead pleads a false (yet dramatic) case of 
injustice. When this happens—when the disguise is put 
on—the scope of the problem is subtly shifted from one 
of personal honesty and repentance to one of 
epistemology.  
This process of disguising the true nature of the 
issue can also be clearly seen in the exchange between 
the Spirit and the ghost of the Bishop in chapter five of 
The Great Divorce: “‘I’m not sure that I’ve got the 
exact point you are trying to make,’ said the Ghost. ‘I 
am not trying to make any point,’ said the Spirit. ‘I am 
telling you to repent and believe.’”11 The ghostly 
Bishop is intent on keeping the scope of the 
conversation in the intellectual realm, but the Spirit sees 
through this and calls him to an act of the will—“repent 
and believe.” Ultimately it is the Bishop’s lack of will 
to repent that prevents him from becoming a solid 
person, and thus from seeing God.  
Christian doctrine and the evidence that supports it 
remains the same, but people often don’t have the will 
to accept it or to abide by it because, as has been 
shown, a greater value is placed on gratification 
promised by sin, or on the prevention of the pain and 
humility brought about by honest acknowledgement of 
sin. In other words, finding the answer to the question 
of God is really not as complicated as often thought, it’s 
just that there is so much about us that is not willing to 
face what that answer implies. As a result, we try to 
evade our responsibility for disbelief by shifting the 
issue into the realm of epistemology where we can 
disguise our lack of will to believe with cries of 
injustice or ignorance or insufficient evidence or flawed 
epistemological method.  
With this in mind, a particular relevance to the task 
of Christian apologetics becomes clear. There is much 
contemporary debate on proper epistemological 
method. This is certainly an important issue, but also 
one which tempts us to think that there is more at stake 
in it than there really is. For those who claim that God 
has not shown himself clearly, choosing the most 
rationally sound epistemological paradigm will not 
help; for them, that which hinders a successful 
epistemology is not rational. Indeed, the most effective 
epistemological method is most clearly articulated by 
Jesus in the answer he gives to the question asked of 
him by the disciple Judas noted earlier: “‘But, Lord, 
why do you intend to show yourself to us and not to the 
world?’ Jesus replied, ‘If anyone loves me, he will obey 
my teaching. My Father will love him, and we will 
come to him and make our home with him.’”12 The way 
to see Jesus is to obey Jesus, and obedience is an act of 
the will.  
This being the case, we must, like the Spirit to the 
Bishop, know when to make a point or to simply say 
(and often to ourselves) “Repent and believe”; we must 
not let the core issue be shifted or disguised. According 
to Lewis, rather than a flawless philosophical paradigm, 
honesty with one’s self and with God is the kingpin, 
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epistemological factor. Replacing dishonesty and 
emotional prejudice with honest repentance will bring 
the truth flowing full and clear like the removal of a 
clog in a water line or the most structurally important 
brick in a dam. We must realize that the keenness of our 
epistemological method (as truly important as it is) will 
be of no effect to anyone who lacks the will to know the 
truth.  
 
Notes 
 
1 Lewis, C.S. The Grand Miracle and other selected 
essays on theology and ethics from God In The Dock, p. 
153. 
2 2 Peter 3:9 
3 Lewis, C.S. Till We Have Faces. Ch. 1, Book 1. 
4 Lewis, C.S. Till We Have Faces. Ch. 12, Book 1, p. 
134. 
5 Lewis, C.S. Till We Have Faces. Ch. 13, Book 1, p. 
150. 
6 Lewis, C.S. A Grief Observed, p. 4. 
7 Lewis, C.S. Till We Have Faces. Ch.3, Book 2, p. 289. 
8 Lewis, C.S. Till We Have Faces. Ch.4, Book 2, p. 294. 
9 Lewis, C.S. A Grief Observed. Ch. 3, p. 53-54. 
10 Lewis, C.S. A Grief Observed. Ch. 2, p. 38. 
11 Lewis, C.S. The Great Divorce. Ch. 5. p. 43. 
12 1 John 14:22-23 
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